

Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, AO, UR

SUBJECT: DRAFT REMARKS SENATE.SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO SENATE
FOREIGNRELATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE ON AFRICA - JANUARY 29, 1976

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN TO YOU AND TO THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE WHY THE PRESIDENT AND I BELIEVE THAT VITAL
AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN THE SOVIET EFFORT TO
IMPOSE A MINORITY FACTION ON THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE WITH THE
FORCE OF ITS ARMS AND CUBAN TROOPS.

WHAT WE HAVE HOPED TO ACHIEVE IN THIS SITUATION WITH A FEW
MILLION DOLLARS IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. IN TYING
THE PRESIDENT'S HANDS, REMOVING THE INDISPENSABLE FLEXI-
BILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE SENATE HAS DONE THIS NATION
A DISSERVICE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH MAY BE FAR-REACHING

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OUR AIMS IN ANGOLA CAN BE SIMPLY DEFINED:

-- WE WISH TO SEE A GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED BY THE ANGOLANS
NOT BY ANOTHER SUPERPOWER.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE MPLA, REPRESENTING A TRIBAL MINORITY, CAN NEITHER IMPOSE NOR MAINTAIN A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT CONTINUED DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SUPPORT.

-- HOWEVER, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE MPLA MUST PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT.

-- BUT AN MPLA, COMING TO POWER THROUGH ITS OWN EFFORTS, DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME POTENTIALLY DISTURBING IMPACT AS A GOVERNMENT IMPOSED BY THE USSR WITH THE AID OF A CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

-- FINALLY, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, WE CANNOT PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO ERODE THE POWER BALANCE IN THE WORLD BY IMPOSING ITS SOCIAL ORDER ON COUNTRIES FAR BEYOND ITS AREA OF TRADITIONAL SECURITY CONCERN.

US INVOLVEMENT:

OUR PRESENT CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW OVER ANGOLA HAS ITS ROOTS IN THE RECENT PAST. ON MARCH 15, 1961, THE UNITED STATES DECLARED ITS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN TERRITORIES. AT THE TIME, THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (FNLA) LAUNCHED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE FROM BASES IN THE CONGO. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, WE SOUGHT TO DEVELOP CONTACTS WITH THE FNLA AND OBTAIN INFORMATION BY PROVIDING IT SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THE USSR HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED LINKS WITH THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (MPLA) THROUGH THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY, BUT THE MPLA DID NOT ENGAGE IN ARMED HOSTILITIES UNTIL THE MID-60S, OPERATING FROM ZAMBIA AND LATER FROM CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE). THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA (UNITA), AN OFFSHOOT OF THE FNLA, ALSO BEGAN TO FIGHT ON A SMALL SCALE IN THE LATE 1960S. JUST AS WE ENCOURAGED FRELIMO IN ITS EARLY DAYS IN TANZANIA, SO WE ALSO PRO-
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VIDED NON-MILITARY AID TO THE FNLA. IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WHICH BECAME THE MAIN SOURCES OF MILITARY TRAINING, ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR SELECTED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES.

THE PORTUGUESE COUP D'ETAT IN APRIL 1974 RESULTED IN THE PLEDGE OF INDEPENDENCE TO ITS AFRICAN TERRITORIES. THE ABORTIVE COUP D'ETAT IN PORTUGAL IN THE FALL OF 1974 AND THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARENTLY CONVINCED MOSCOW THAT A "REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION" WAS DEVELOPING IN THE METROPOLE AND THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES WHICH IT SHOULD TRY AND EXPLOIT. THE

SOVIETS ACCORDINGLY MADE MODERATE SHIPMENTS OF ARMS AND

EQUIPMENT TO THE MPLA IN THE LATE FALL.

WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WHICH DIVIDED THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, BUT WE SHARED THE HOPE OF THE PORTUGUESE THAT SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO AVOID A CIVIL WAR OF THE TYPE THAT DEVASTED THE CONGO AFTER ITS INDEPENDENCE. BUT, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, THE USSR PLAYED THE SPOILING ROLE AS IT HAD TRIED TO DO IN THE CONGO IN 1960.

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE ALVOR ACCORD, SIGNED ON JANUARY 15, 1975, A TRANSITIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ANGOLA. IT WAS CHARGED WITH PREPARING FOR A PEACEFUL TURNOVER OF POWER BY INTEGRATING THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE THREE MOVEMENTS, WRITING A CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZING AN ELECTION TO TAKE PLACE SOMETIME AFTER INDEPENDENCE, SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 11, 1975.

THIS MOMENT WHEN PORTUGAL WAS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE WAS A MOMENT FOR RESTRAINT BY ALL OUTSIDE PARTIES. IT WAS PRECISELY THE SORT OF "SITUATION CAPABLE OF CAUSING A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS" IN WHICH THE US AND THE USSR HAD PLEDGED THEMSELVES IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS SIGNED IN MOSCOW IN MAY 1972 TO SHOW "MUTUAL RESTRAINT" AND TO REFRAIN FROM "EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT CONFIDENTIAL

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THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER." YET, PRECISELY AT THIS MOMENT WHEN THE PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES WERE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A DELICATE BALANCE AMONG THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, IT APPEARS THAT THE USSR AND THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS DECIDED TO PUT THE MPLA IN POWER IN ANGOLA THROUGH STEPPED UP SHIPMENTS OF ARMS. MADE BOLD BY THE PROSPECTS OF SOVIET SUPPORT AND OPERATING OUT OF ITS OWN ETHNIC BASE OF LUANDA, THE MPLA HAD LITTLE INCENTIVE TO ACCEPT THE ROLE OF MINORITY PARTNER IN A FUTURE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA. THE MPLA SAW THAT IT WAS BECOMING STRONG ENOUGH TO EXCLUDE BOTH UNITA AND THE FNLA FROM ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THAT MAJOR VIOLENCE BROKE OUT IN MARCH WHEN LARGE SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS BEGAN TO ARRIVE, THOUSANDS OF INFANTRY WEAPONS, MACHINE GUNS AND BAZOOKAS -- WEAPONS THAT THE USSR MUST HAVE BEGUN TO ASSEMBLE AND SHIP AS EARLY AS JANUARY.

ON MARCH 23 THE FIRST OF REPEATED MILITARY CLASHES BETWEEN THE MPLA AND FNLA OCCURRED. THEY INCREASED IN FREQUENCY IN APRIL, MAY AND JUNE, WHEN DELIVERIES OF COMMUNIST ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING MORTARS AND ARMORED VEHICLES,

CONTINUED TO FLOW INTO LUANDA, DIRECTLY BY SEA AND THROUGH THE CONGO BY AIR AND SEA. IN MAY, THE MPLA FORCED THE

FNLA OUT OF AREAS NORTH AND EAST OF LUANDA AND IN JUNE, IT TOOK EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CABINDA. ON JULY 9 ALL-OUT CIVIL WAR BEGAN WHEN THE MPLA ATTACKED THE FNLA AND UNITA, DRIVING BOTH ORGANIZATIONS OUT OF LUANDA, THEREBY ENDING THE SHORT-LIVED COALITION GOVERNMENT. IT IS PERHAPS NO COINCIDENCE THAT, IN PORTUGAL, THIS PERIOD MARCH TO JULY 1975 WAS THE HIGH POINT OF COMMUNIST MILITANCY WHEN THE COUNTRY APPEARED ON THE BRINK OF REVOLUTION.

THE MILITARY SITUATION OF THE FNLA AND PARTICULARLY UNITA BECAME INCREASINGLY DESPERATE. THE FNLA DREW ON NEIGHBORING ZAIRE FOR SOME TRAINING AND HELP IN HANDLING MODERN WEAPONS LIKE ARMORED CARS AND MORTARS. THE UNITA FORCES DID NOT HAVE WEAPONS FOR MORE THAN A TENTH OF THEIR 30-40,000 TROOPS WHICH HAD FOUGHT AS GUERRILLAS FOR YEARS, AND THEY DID NOT HAVE PERSONNEL TO HANDLE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. IT WAS IN THIS SITUATION THAT ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA
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TURNED TO THE US FOR ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING WHAT WAS INCREASINGLY BEING PERCEIVED AS A SOVIET POWER PLAY TO PUT THE RADICAL MINORITY FACTION IN CONTROL OF ANGOLA AND THREATEN THE STABILITY OF CENTRAL AFRICA.

US ASSISTANCE:

IN JANUARY 1975, WE DIFFERED SOMEWHAT FROM THE PORTUGUESE IN OUR PERCEPTION OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE NEW PROVISIONAL LUANDAN GOVERNMENT. IT APPEARED TO US, AS THE MPLA FORCES LANDED IN THEIR OWN HOME BASE OF LUANDA WITH NEW SOVIET EQUIPMENT THAT THEY WERE THE STRONGEST FACTION. OUR CONCERN AT THAT TIME WAS TO PROVIDE THE FNLA WITH THE MEANS TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY IN A POLITICAL, NOT A MILITARY STRUGGLE IN LUANDA. WE ACCORDINGLY PROVIDED THE FNLA WITH SOME US DOLS. 300,000 FOR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WORK WHICH WE CONTINUED, AS IN THE PAST, TO DOLE OUT IN SMALL INCREMENTS EACH MONTH.

MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THIS US DOLS. 300,000, AS THOUGH IT JUSTIFIED OR PROVOKED THE MASSIVE SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT. TO PUT THIS ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN CONTRIBUTED OVER US DOLS. 1,400,000 TO THE MPLA FOR SOCIAL ACTION BETWEEN JULY 1974 AND JUNE 1975. WE ESTIMATE THAT IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1975, THE USSR SHIPPED OVER 100 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT INTO ANGOLA IN SUPPORT OF THE MPLA.

BY JULY 18 WHEN PRESIDENT FORD DECIDED TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR HELP AND TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE FNLA AND UNITA FORCES, THROUGH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, THE MILITARY SITUATION HAD BADLY DETERIORATED. IN AUGUST,

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS, TRAINERS AND TROOPS, 8ND ALTHOUGH DEFINITE CONFIRMATION DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL OCTOBER, POSSIBLY CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS. BY SEPTEMBER, THE MPLA OFFENSIVE HAD FORCED UNITA OUT OF SEVERAL MAJOR CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ANGOLAN CITIES AND IT CONTROLLED MOST OF THE COASTLINE EXCEPT FOR A STRIP IN THE FAR NORTH, MUCH OF THE SOUTH AND A WIDE BELT RUNNING FROM LUANCA TO THE
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ZAIRIAN BORDER IN THE EAST.

SOUTH AFRICA STEPS IN:

IT WAS CONCERN OVER THESE MPLA SUCCESSES WHICH APPARENTLY CAUSED SOUTH AFRICA TO INTERVENE IN ANGOLA. THE INITIAL SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION IN AUGUST WAS TO INSTALL A DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND TWO DAM SITES UNDER CONSTRUCTION JOINTLY WITH THE PORTUGUESE JUST NEAR THE NAMIBIAN BORDER. BUT THE RELATIVELY POORLY EQUIPPED UNITA FORCES TURNED IN DESPERATION IN EARLY SEPTEMBER TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR ASSISTANCE AGAINST THE MPLA WHICH WAS OVERRUNNING UNITA'S ETHNIC AREA IN THE SOUTH. SOUTH AFRICA RESPONDED BY SENDING IN TROOPS WHICH NEVER AMOUNTED TO MUCH MORE THAN 1,000 MEN.

IN REACTING TO PROTECT WHAT THEY PERCEIVED AS THEIR OWN VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT NO TIME CONSULTED THE UNITED STATES. WE DEPLORE THE ENTRY OF SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE ANGOLAN FRAY, FOR IT HAS INEVITABLY WEAKENED POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE VICTIMS OF SOVIET/ CUBAN AGGRESSION. BUT, IN ALL FAIRNESS, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION REPRESENTED A REACTION TO THE PROSPECT OF A SIGNIFICANT SOVIET PRESENCE DESIGNED TO IMPOSE AN MPLA GOVERNMENT ON ANGOLA BY FORCE. I CANNOT SAY WHETHER THE USSR HOPED TO PROVOKE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION, AND THEREBY COVER ITS OWN TRACKS. BUT CERTAINLY THE FUROR ACCOMPANYING SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMNT HAS SERVED TO MUTE AFRICAN CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION, TO UNDERCUT AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE FNLA AND UNITA FORCES AND TO PROMOTE A MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR OWN POSITION.

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS AND MILITARY ADVISERS IN ANGOLA IN SEPTEMBER, A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTEROFFENSIVE WAS LAUNCHED IN OCTOBER WHICH SWEEPED THE MPLA

OUT OF THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AND MOST OF THE CENTRAL PART OF ANGOLA. BY NOVEMBER 11 WHEN THE PORTUGUESE GAVE ANGOLA ITS INDEPENDENCE, THE MPLA CONTROLLED ONLY THE FORMER
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COLONIAL CAPITAL OF LUANDA AND FOUR OTHER DISTRICT CAPITALS COMPRISING A NARROW BELT ACROSS NORTH-CENTRAL ANGOLA.

LISBON'S HOPES TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN THE HANDS OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ALL THE MAJOR POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN THE COUNTRY WERE SHATTERED. AND INSTEAD, LISBON HAD TO WITHDRAW ITS REMAINING 10,000 TROOPS AND TURN OVER THE REINS OF AUTHORITY TO WHAT IT EUPHEMISTICALLY TERMED "THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA," WHO PROCEEDED TO SET UP RIVAL CAPITALS: THE MPLA IN LUANDA AND THE FNLA AND UNITA IN HUAMBO. THE BATTLE FOR ANGOLA CONTINUED.

THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE MPLA'S REVERSE WAS MASSIVELY TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND TO HELP FERRY MORE CUBAN TROOPS TO ANGOLA. IN THE FACE OF THE REVERSES SUFFERED BY THE MPLA AT THE HANDS OF THE UNITA/SOUTH AFRICAN STRIKE FORCE, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD INAUGURATED AN AIRLIFT OF TROOPS TO ANGOLA IN LATE OCTOBER. THIS AIRLIFT HAS CONTINUED UP TO TODAY SO THAT THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IS BELIEVED TO NUMBER AT THE PRESENT TIME BETWEEN 8,000 AND 9,000 MEN. A TOTAL OF AT LEAST 46 FLIGHTS OF SOVIET HEAVY AND MEDIUM MILITARY TRANSPORTS HAVE FERRIED SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE USSR TO LUANDA AND CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE, WHILE A STEADY STREAM OF IL-62S AND CUBANA AIRWAYS BRISTOL BRITANNIAS HAS CONTINUED TO SHUTTLE CUBAN TROOPS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC.

TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS, THE SOVIET UNION IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE SENT, IN THE NINE MONTHS ENDING AT THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY 1976, CLOSE TO US DOLS. 200 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO ANGOLA. THIS APPROXIMATELY EQUALLED ALL MILITARY AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 1974. BY COMPARISON, US ASSISTANCE AMOUNTED TO ONLY US DOLS. 32 MILLION, MOST OF IT IN TRANSPORT COSTS.

THE DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET ARMS AID THROUGH MID-DECEMBER 1975 ARE WORTH NOTING:

-- A TOTAL OF 24 SOVIET VESSELS AND NUMEROUS AIR LIFTS
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ARE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO HAVE DELIVERED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PORTS IN ANGOLA OR THE CONGO WHICH INCLUDED: INFANTRY WEAPONS, MACHINE GUNS, BAZOOKAS, MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, HEAVY

ARTILLERY, LIGHT AND MEDIUM TANKS, TRUCK-MOUNTED, MULTITUBE ROCKET LAUNCHERS, HELICOPTERS AND LIGHT AIRCRAFT

(THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN PERSISTENT BUT STILL UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO PROVIDE THE MPLA WITH MIG-21 AIRCRAFT TO BE PILOTED BY CUBANS).

THE WEIGHT OF THIS SOVIET/CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE BEGAN TO TIP THE SCALES BY EARLY DECEMBER.

THE OAU:

IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE USSR, CUBA AND THE MPLA AND ITS AFRICAN SUPPORTERS HOPED TO ACHIEVE A MAJOR MILITARY VICTORY ON THE EVE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY'S EXTRAORDINARY SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN ADDIS ABABA THIS JANUARY IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO AFRICAN STATES STILL FAVORING A COALITION GOVERNMENT THAT THE ONLY REALISTIC COALITION WAS ONE DOMINATED BY AND ORGANIZED BY THE MPLA. NEVERTHELESS AT THE TIME OF THE OAU CONFERENCE, NOTH WITHSTANDING THEIR REVERSES, THE FNLA/UNITA FORCES CONTROLLED ABOUT 70 PERCENT OF THE TERRITORY AND 70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF ANGOLA.

LET US LOOK AT THE OAU ROLE BEFORE THE JANUARY SUMMIT. AN OAU RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WHICH MET IN 1975 TOOK THE POSITION THAT NONE OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THE COMMISSION ALSO CALLED FOR A CEASE FIRE AND THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IT WOULD APPEAR, THEREFORE, THAT THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHICH INSISTED ON RECOGNIZING THE MPLA WERE THE ONES TO VIOLATE A DECISION OF THE OAU.

THERE HAS BEEN A SIMILAR EFFORT TO OBFUSCATE WHAT REALLY HAPPENED RECENTLY AT ADDIS. IT IS TRUE THAT 22 MEMBERS OF THE OAU ADVOCATED RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA AND CONFIDENTIAL

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DEMnation OF SOUTH AFRICA. BUT THEY WERE OPPOSED IN AN UNUSUAL DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY BY 22 OTHER MEMBERS WHO HELD OUT FOR A MORE BALANCED RESOLUTION, ONE THAT WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: 1) AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE; 2) CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES; 3) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; 4) AN END TO THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ALL FACIONS; AND 5) RECONCILIATION OF ALL FACTIONS WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY -- A PROGRAM WHICH WE COULD GENERALLY SUPPORT AS BEING REASONABLE AND RESPONSIVE TO THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION.

THE MODERATE BLOC WHICH REMAINS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE OVERWHELMING SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, REFUSED AT ADDIS TO ACCEPT ANY RESOLUTION THAT DID NOT

CALL FOR AN END TO ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION. AS A RESULT OF THIS IMPASSE, NO RESOLUTION ISSUED FROM THE SUMMIT, NO NATION WAS CONDEMNED AND NO GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA WAS RECOGNIZED.

HAVING FAILED TO WIN THE BATTLE OF DIPLOMACY, THE MPLA NOW SEEMS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THE DRAMATIC MILITARY VICTORY WHICH HASHITHERTO ELUDED IT. THE DEATH TOLL RISES, BUT THE USSR, CUBA AND THE MPLA AND ITS AFRICAN SUPPORTERS ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT TO THE LAST ANGOLAN FOR THEIR "RIGHT" TO IMPOSE ON THAT POOR COUNTRY THE REGIME OF THEIR --NOT THE ANGOLAN -- PREFERENCE.

THE US POSITION:

MANY AMERICANS, MANY MEMBERS OF THIS CONGRESS BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET OURSELVES GET INVOLVED. EVEN THE VERY MINIMAL AID WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED IS SEEN AS A DANGEROUS FIRST STEP ON A SLIPPERY SLOPE LEADING US DOWN INTO ANOTHER VIET-NAM MORASS. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASSURED THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT NO AMERICAN TROOPS WILL EVER SERVE IN ANGOLA. AND I REITERATE TO YOU TODAY THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE ARE NO AMERICAN MERCENARIES IN ANGOLA. I CANNOT GUARANTEE, OF COURSE, THAT SOME AMERICAN MERCENARY MAY NOT HAVE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOLD HIS SERVICES TO ONE OF THE FIGHTING PARTIES, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE KNOW OF NONE, AND WE CERTAINLY HAVE HIRED NONE.

WHY DO I THINK YOUR CONCERNS ARE MISPLACED? PUT IN THE SIMPLEST TERMS, THE SOVIETS HAVE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR HISTORY, A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE AT WILL ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD -- A CAPABILITY WHICH WAS HITHERTO A MONOPOLY OF THE UNITED STATES. WE DO NOT CONTEST THE SOVIET RIGHT TO DEVELOP THESE ATTRIBUTES OF A GREAT POWER -- PROVIDED THEY ALSO DEMONSTRATE THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH SHOULD ACCOMPANY GREAT POWER. THE QUESTION REALLY IS HOW THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES SEE THEIR NEW ROLE, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS ARE CALLING ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO DRAW BACK AFTER VIET-NAM, AND REDUCE OUR OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS.

IN AN ARTICLE IN THE SOVIET THEORETICAL JOURNAL, KOMMUNIST, LAST SEPTEMBER, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

LISTED THE THREE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS BEING: CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP; PROMOTION OF DETENTE WITH THE WEST; AND SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. AND PROBABLY WITH AN EYE TO ANGOLA,

GROMYKO AFFIRMED THE CLASSICAL SOVIET POSITION THAT THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR A POLICY OF DETENTE AND SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION.

THERE HAS BEEN A DEBATE GOING ON IN THE USSR, AS THERE HAS BEEN IN THIS COUNTRY, REGARDING THE ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF DETENTE. THERE ARE SOVIET OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THE MORE DOCTRINAIRE, WHO BELIEVE THAT THE USSR HAS BEEN SHORTCHANGED IN THE PROCESS, AND ALSO THAT IT HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON ITS ALLIES ABROAD IN THE COMMUNIST AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS FOR THE SAKE OF AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. SOME OF THE MORE RADICAL STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MAY ONLY BE INTENDED, LIKE SOME STATEMENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS, TO PROTECT THE SPEAKER AGAINST CRITICS ON ONE FLANK OR ANOTHER. AT THE SAME
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TIME, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE MERELY RHETORIC. AND, INDEED, IT IS THE NARROWING OF THE GAP BETWEEN MILITANT ACTION AND RHETORIC IN THE ANGOLAN SITUATION WHICH HAS CAUSED ME SERIOUS CONCERN.

THE USSR HAS EVEN LESS VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN DISTANT ANGOLA THAN WE DO -- AND DIRECT US INTERESTS THERE ARE MINIMAL.

IN THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD, WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SOVIET AID TO NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN THE PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES WAS ENTIRELY ALTRUISTIC, BUT IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT THE PROSPECT OF INDEPENDENCE PROMISED TO PUT AN END TO AT LEAST THIS SORT OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE. BUT WHAT, IN FACT, HAPPENED IN THE CASE OF ANGOLA? MOSCOW, IN EFFECT, CONTINUED THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION" STRUGGLE INTO THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD IN A CYNICAL AND OPPORTUNISTIC PLAY TO PUT ITS FRIENDS IN POWER.

TO ALLOW THE USSR TO GET AWAY WITH THIS POWER PLAY EIGHT THOUSAND MILES FROM ITS HOME, IN AN AREAS WHERE IT BELIEVES THE US WILL NOT RESIST, CAN ONLY STRENGTHEN THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHO WOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO "NATIONAL LIBERATION" OBJECTIVES OVER THOSE OF IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE NEXT TIME THAT SOME RADICAL GROUP SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIETS APPEALS FOR HELP IN A POWER STRUGGLE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY, THE

USSR, ON THE BASIS OF ITS PERCEPTION OF OUR WILL TO REACT, MAY BE TEMPTED TO INTERVENE AGAIN IN FULFILLMENT OF ITS "INTERNATIONALIST DUTY" IN A SEEMING LOW-RISK AREA. IT IS PRECISELY THIS SORT OF MISCALCULATION WHICH CAN PRODUCE SERIOUS CONFRONTATION, CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF EITHER

SIDE.

RELATIONSHIP OF AFRICA TO GLOBAL STATES:

THE STAKES IN ANGOLA ARE GREATER THAN THEY APPEAR ON THE SURFACE FOR THERE IS A DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR AFRICAN AND OUR GLOBAL CONCERNS.

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ANGOLA IS BORDERED BY TWO TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY STATES, ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE ASKED US FOR HELP, BOTH OF WHICH ARE VERY CONCERNED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR FUTURE SECURITY OF A GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA DOMINATED BY THE OBLIGATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH THE MPLA HAS INCURRED. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR FEARS ARE JUSTIFIED WILL DEPEND ON THE SORT OF POLICIES WHICH THE MPLA FOLLOWS SHOULD IT COME TO POWER. THIS WOULD DEPEND, IN TURN, ON HOW IT CAME TO POWER. A COALITION GOVERNMENT INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITA AND FNLA MOVEMENTS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SEEK GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS THAN ONE FACED WITH PROLONGED INSURGENCY. AN MPLA FACED WITH INSURGENCY WOULD ALSO BE DISINCLINED TO SEND THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS HOME, AND MORE INCLINED TO TRY AND TOPPLE ITS NEIGHBORS. GIVEN ITS CONTROL OVER THE BENGUELA RAILROAD, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPERITY OF BOTH ZAMBIA AND ZAIRE, A LUANDA GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO APPLY DAMAGING PRESSURE.

ZAIRE AND ZAMBIA CAN BE EXPECTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO LOOK ABROAD FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO BOLSTER THEIR SECURITY. THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE BEEN SHAKEN, IF THEY SEE THAT THE USSR WAS ABLE TO IMPOSE A REGIME OF ITS CHOICE ON ANGOLA WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT US OPPOSITION. AND IF WE THEN CANNOT RESPOND TO THEIR FEARS AND NEEDS IN A CREDIBLE FASHION, WE CANNOT BLINK AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY -- AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES -- WILL ADJUST THEIR POLITICAL STANCE TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY.

FOR THE US TO BE FOUND WANTING IN AFRICA AS A CREDIBLE FRIEND, PRECISELY AT THE TIME WHEN A GROUP OF MODERATE STATES HAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED ITS FERVENT HOPE THAT THE US WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY BALANCE TO SOVIET ASPIRATIONS WOULD BE A LOSS OF AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE US

TO FIND FRIENDS IN AFRICA. EVEN MANY OF OUR CRITICS LOOK TO US AS THE NATURAL COUNTER-BALANCE TO THE USSR AND THEIR ULTIMATE PROTECTION. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT WE LACK THE WILL, IF NOT THE POWER TO PLAY THIS ROLE, CONFIDENTIAL

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WILL HAVE FAR REACHING POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. WHEN SOVIET THEORETICIANS TALK ABOUT THE CHANGING "CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN THE WORLD, THEY HAVE IN MIND WHETHER THE COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE INCLINED TO FAVOR THE US OR THE USSR IN SITUATIONS OF CONFRONTATION AND ON ISSUES IN DISPUTE. THE POSITIONS OF MANY GOVERNMENTS ARE DETERMINED AFTER ALL, BY THEIR EVALUATION OF THE POWER BALANCE, NOT BY ANY ABSTRACT JUDGMENTS ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE EMERGENCE OF A LUANDA REGIME, HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET AND CUBAN ARMS, CAN ALSO HAVE AN UNSETTLING IMPACT ON THE NEW DIALOGUE ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES. THE USSR HAS NO INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN OR NAMIBIAN ISSUE OR SOUTH AFRICA'S SYSTEM OF APARTHEID. THE ISSUE OF "NATIONAL LIBERATION" OF THE OPPRESSED BLACK POPULATION IN RHODESIA, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA PROVIDES MOSCOW WITH A PLATFORM ON WHICH IT CAN RALLY SUPPORT FROM ALLPARTSO F AFRICA, OUTFLANKING THE CHINESE AND THE WEST.

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER MOSCOW DECIDES THAT THE BALANCE SHEET OF ITS INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA JUSTIFIES FURTHER SUCH ADVENTURES, IT WILL HAVE MADE ITS POINT. THE LEADERS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WITH A STRONG RADICAL OPPOSITION, MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE USSR HAS BOTH THE ABILITY AND THE WILL TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF ITS FRIENDS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD. IF, IN ADDITION, WITH A SMALL INPUT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND THE PROXY USE OF A CUBAN ARMY, MOSCOW SHOULD FIND IT WAS ABLE TO UPSET THE TRULY NON-ALIGNED ORIENTATION OF A NUMBER OF KEY STATES IN AFRICA, THE TEMPTATION TO TRY IN ANOTHER SITUATION OF OPPORTUNITY CANNOT HELP BUT BE STRONG.

BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US RECOGNIZE THAT OUR RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ANTAGONISTIC AND COMPETITIVE IN MANY AREAS. HENCE OUR EFFORTS TO TRY AND ESTABLISH CERTAIN GUIDELINES OF BEHAVIOR TO INSULATE OUR RELATIONSHIP FROM THE SHOCK OF UNNECESSARY CONFRONTATION. THE PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT IN AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST ASSUMES, HOWEVER, THAT THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN US WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL

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ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. THIS ASSUMPTION CAN BE UPSET, OF COURSE, IF WE SLACKEN OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE IN THE FACE OF A CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP. BUT

THE BALANCE CAN ALSO BE UPSET IF WE DEMONSTRATE BY OUR FAILURE TO REACT TO A SOVIET PROBE IN A DISTANT PART OF THE WORLD THAT WE LACK THE WILL TO USE THE POWER WHICH WE POSSESS.

AT THIS POINT IN OUR EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, I THINK THAT THE SIGNAL WHICH THE SENATE GAVE TO THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN MOSCOW, AND TO THOSE WAITING IN THE WINGS TO TAKE OVER THAT LEADERHSIP IS A MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS ONE.

THE SIGNAL THAT WE ARE TRANSMITTING, THE PRINCIPLE WE SEEM TO BE SUPPORTING IS THAT EVEN IF THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENES -N A MASSIVE WAY, AND EVEN IF CUBAN OR OTHER TROOPS ARE USED AS AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVEN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE WHO ARE THREATENED.

CAN A COUNTRY FACED WITH THIS THREAT -- AND I ASK THIS QUESTION IN UTTER SERIOUSNESS -- CAN A COUNTRY FACED WITH THIS THREAT WITHOUT HOPE OF ASSISTANCE FROM US BE EXPECTED TO RESIST? IS THIS WHAT THE CONGRESS WANTS?

IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS AND AT SOME INDEFINITE DATE IN THE FUTURE, AFRICAN NATIONALISM WILL REASSERT ITSELF. EVEN IF THAT IS TRUE, ARE WE PREPARED TO DEPEND ON THE FICKLENESS OF HISTORY TO WORK FOR US? A COUNTRY WHICH IS THREATENED CANNOT WAIT FOR HISTORY -- IT MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO YIELD NOW. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IS SMALL SOLACE FOR THOSE WHO MUST FACE LIFE TODAY.

I HAVE HEARD WITH DISMAY THOSE WHO EQUATE WHAT WE ARE DOING IN ANGOLA WITH VIET-NAM. NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. ARE WEGOING TO ALLOW OUR TRAUMA OVER VIET-NAM TO IMMOBILIZE THIS GREAT NATION FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL

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INDEFINITE FUTURE? YOU, ALONG WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE HOUSE, ARE THE GUARANTEE THAT THIS ANALOGY IS FALSE. WE WILL NOT SEND ON SINGLE AMERICAN INTO BATTLE IN ANGOLA. OUR PITIFULLY SMALL ASSISTANCE AIMED AT THE CREATION OF A SITUATION IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS ALLOWED TO PREVAIL CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH VIET-NAM.

SOME CHARGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO COLLUSION WITH SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER THE POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA. THAT IS A MYTH THAT HAS BEEN GOING THE ROUNDS FOR YEARS. SOUTH AFRICA DETERMINES ITS OWN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF ITS OWN PERCEIVED INTERESTS. WE HAVE

NOT APPROVED OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND WE DO NOT APPROVE IT NOW. WE WILL DETERMINE OUR POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF OUR OWN INTERESTS AND IT WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

OUR INTEREST IS IN AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM. DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT, HAD THERE BEEN NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE INITIATED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE AFRICANS WOULD HAVE FOUND A SOLUTION TO THE ANGOLA PROBLEM. NO SINGLE MOVEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN STRONG ENOUGH TO IMPOSE ITSELF AND THE RESULTING SOLUTION WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA THAN A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ANY ONE MOVEMENT.

WHATEVER YOU THINK OF ME, WHATEVER YOU THINK OF OUR POLICY, I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT MY PROFESSIONAL LIFE HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO A CLOSE STUDY OF THE FORCES WHICH SHAPE OUR WORLD. AND IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT WHAT WE DO IN THIS SITUATION -- OR MORE IMPORTANTLY WHAT WE DON'T DO -- CAN BE DECISIVE IN SHAPING OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND IN DETERMINING WHETHER THIS COUNTRY IS PREPARED TO PLAY THE ROLE WHICH ITS POWER AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY DEMAND OF IT. IF WE FAIL TO DEMONSTRATE OUT DETERMINATION AND OUR WILL, THE FUTURE WILL INDEED SEEM BLEAK FOR US AND OUR FRIENDS. SISCO

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